At the moment, I am reading Kant - specifically, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals - for the first time. Now, whether or not I ought to have read Kant before and what exactly I think of Kant are questions which will have to wait. Much more important to get across here is that Kant... well, a sample of text says it so much better than I could:
This will may therefore not be the single and entire good, but it must be the highest good, and the condition for all the rest, even for the demand for happiness, in which case it can be united with the wisdom of nature, when one perceives that the culture of reason, which is required for the former, limits in many way the attainment of the second aim, which is always conditioned, namely of happiness, at least in this life, and can even diminish it to less than nothing without nature's proceeding unpurposively in this; for reason, which recognizes its highest practical vocation in the grounding of a good will, is capable in attaining this aim only of a contentment after its own kind, namely from the fulfillment of an end that again only reason determines, even if this should also be bound up with infringement of the ends of inclination.
The translation I'm reading claims that it deliberately left many of the awkwardnesses that other translations take out in, since that's what Kant's really like. Still, WTF? Whatever the thought is here, surely there is a way of expressing it that isn't quite so hideous.