Tuesday, May 16, 2006

A Matter Of Life And Death

One of the recurrent complaints Bernard Williams has about most contemporary liberal political theory is, roughly, that it underestimates the extent to which some slightly modified version of Clausewitz's axiom that 'war is politics by other means' is not only true but constitutive of politics. For example, he says of political decisions that they do

not in [themselves] announce that the other party was morally wrong, or indeed wrong at all. What [they] immediately [announce] is that they have lost.

The upshot of this is that he is unwilling to attempt to place any serious limits on the legitimacy of political disagreements as such. Because politics is about conflict over the distribution of the various benefits of social cooperation, as long as such conflict continues to present itself as an argument about the distribution of the various benefits of social cooperation, rather than a naked grab for power on the part of some group or other and hence no longer about social cooperation, that fact of conflict is regulative: placing limits on conflict would be an attempt to prevent the relevant groups from disagreeing about what they can disagree about, and thus an attempt to breach politics' regulative ideal.

Tom Nagel, in his 'Equality and Partiality', has a slightly different argument to the same conclusion. He sees, correctly in my view, the problem of political legitimacy as the problem of

[w]hat, if anything, can we all agree that we should do, given that our motives are not merely impersonal?

However, in his schema, this personal perspective is to be opposed to the impersonal perspective, which is the sole source of value. For Nagel, then, phrasing the problem of political legitimacy in this way means that definitionally non-evaluative considerations have weight in any discourse of political legitimacy. As long as I can be resolutely and stubbornly selfish for long enough, I do not have to adduce any reasons which any one else would regard as conclusive or even weighty in favour of that selfishness: the fact that, so far as anyone can tell, whatever I gain from being selfish really matters to me is enough to show that it ought to be given weight of some sort in designing a set of rules to distribute the benefits of social cooperation.

Clearly, Nagel's problems really begin with his sharp distincton between the impersonal and personal perspectives: the entirely accurate description of holding out for something which can have no reasons given in favour of it as selfish shows, fairly conclusively I would have thought, that evaluative language is ineliminable from a personal perspective, whatever that might be anyway. Given that, it is very odd to think that simply being sufficiently stubborn serves to legitimate any demand that someone could make: the question of that demand's evaluation is already an open one, and so why we should abstain from making judgements on it is fair from clear.

Williams seems to have exactly the same problem. Indeed, given his deep commitment to the idea that thick evaluative concepts are an intrinsic and unavoidable part of normal discourse, an idea he thinks the importance of is insufficiently appreciated by most contemporary philosophy, it is a much more serious problem for him. Nagel, however oddly, can at least consistently maintain that selfishness is appropriate and legitimating when considering the structure of various political institutions, but Williams has the difficulty that to describe, if accurate, something as selfish is not only a critique, but a critique that he must regard as reasonable. He cannot in good conscience hold to some version of Nagel's distinction because of his position on the necessarily evaluative nature of normal discourse, yet, in denying that there are proper limits to political disputes, he seems to be saying that a particular evaluative category, that of the unreasonable, is, at least with respect to politics, inadmissible.

This is odd, because Williams recognises precisely this problem in the communitarian critique of post-Rawlsian liberal thought. Such a critique, as he does, urges attention to a particular community's linguistic and conceptual resources, claiming that in the absence of proper attention to them, a process of alienation occurs: a fully ethical life becomes impossible, as the evaluative categories necessary to sustain become attenuated and disappear. MacIntyre's infamous piece of absolutely hyperbolic rhetoric comparing the disappearance of various ethical traditions to an imagined destruction of the capacity to understand modern chemistry is perhaps the best example of this.

The problem Williams finds with such a critique is that it, in a way, denies the possibility of its own existence. For such a critique, he says in 'Pluralism, Community and Left Wittgensteinianism',

[t]he redirection of an ethical term, or more generally, the radical departure from an ethical practice, looks as though it will be merely arbitrary unless it can carry... a substantive body of agreement with it; indeed, some critics of the picture might say that even this is a kindly understatement, and that the consequence of the picture is that no change in practice comprehensibly occur unless it has already occurred - that is to say, it cannot occur at all except by magic.

The critique reifies practice to such an extent that it denies the obvious fact of ethical change, and because of that, if it is to position itself as critique of ethical change, the existence of what it purports to criticise. To put it another way, such a critique, because of the attention it demands for whatever ethical practices there are, can hardly critique exisiting ethical practices as deviant: they are precisely the ethical practices it ought to be demanding attention for. As Williams puts it:

[T]he Wittgensteinian is himself criticizing something, if only the practices of ethical theorists... part of our ethical practice consists precisely in this, that people have found in it resources with which to criticize their society. Practice is not just the practice of practice, but also the practice of criticism.

This, however, works against him too. Indisputably, people have coherently spoken of proper limits to political disagreement, primarily by attempting to articulate limits on the morally acceptable exercise of power. The area of legitimate dispute is not infinite, even within the bounds of the claim to authority rather than simple power, an area I fear Williams would find difficult to demark anyway for reasons essentially similar to those which cause him to struggle with the claim that no disagreement is necessarily illegitimate. For all that politics is about winning and losing, there are means to and forms of victory we rule out of court. Clausewitz's axiom cannot be, in its normal sense, regulative.

19 comments:

Anonymous said...

Clausewitz's axiom may not be regulative but unfortunately it can be constitutive.

Rob Jubb said...

Yeah, maybe, but that doesn't really help Williams. After all

"Political moralism may not be a good theory of politics as it exists, but it is a perfectly good theory of politics as we should aspire to make it."

Also, I don't want to be funny, but I'd prefer it if commenters at least gave a pseudonym.

Rob Jubb said...

Actually, sorry anonymous: football-related drinking may be causing unneccessary harshness. That's a perfectly fair point, and apologies for the anti-anonymity snark.

Ben said...

Too late to read your post, but having seen your comments and borrowed the book today I really think I should have tried to get it...

Ben said...

I agree with the idea that winning is just winning, not being shown better.

I'm also sympathetic to the appeal to Clausewitz, who's quoted in my thesis, except I'd reverse his aphorism with a more Hobbesian spin - I think violent conflict came first, and politics (if that's means something peaceful, e.g. voting) came about after, as a way to avoid this violence.

Rob Jubb said...

Ben,

I think you may have misunderstood Clausewitz: the Hobbesian spin you put on him seems to me to negate his point. If war is politics by other means, then politics is also war by other means, which rules out politics being a solution to war (or violence: but then, is war the same kind of thing as pre-political Hobbesian violence?).

I'm with you on the winning - losing thing. The question turns rather though, on what the implication of politics being, in this sense, about winning and losing.

Ben said...

I'd did say I was reversing his point... I suppose there is a question of interpretation, whether he'd consider war to be a form of politics (by unconventional means) or whether the means characterise the difference between (peaceful) politics and (violent) war.

My understanding was that when peaceful negotiation runs out, both sides resort to war - still with the aim of pressing their way against conflicting interests, but via new violent/non-political means. My contention was that war was the primitive, and politics evolved as a way of resolving such disputes without violence. Ergo, politics is war (competition) by other (non-violent) means.

Ben said...

Possibly better clarification:

To go from 'war is politics' to 'politics is war', you assume the 'is' is identity.

I assume either war is a subset of politics or that the 'by other means' actually defeats the identity making it a mere analogy (like 'basketball is football with hands instead of feet')

Rob Jubb said...

Ben,

I'd always assumed the strong identity claim and I think it is mandated: try 'a free market economy is slavery by other means'. This would not naturally be read as a claim about the free market economy being some kind of significant improvement on, or solution to the problems of, slavery.

Ben said...

I don't think a strong identity claim is mandated in this case, because it's not how I'd ever understood it.

Besides, more significantly, I'm not sure if he ever uses those exact words. I don't have my copy with me, but the phrase I quote in my thesis actually runs "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse"

[On War VIII vi. Wordworth Classics edition (trans J. J. Graham, revised F. N. Maude) p.357. C.f. I i 24, 26 (Wordsworth pp.22-3)]

Which, I think, looks less like an identity claim...

Rob Jubb said...

'The freemarket is nothing but the continuation of slavery'?

Ben said...

A Marxist-type might well say something like that, but I don't think you'd say it also means 'slavery is a continuation of the free market'. It's not a strong identity claim, like x=x, because it implies some kind of priority to one side, of which the other is merely a continuation.

And I'm still not sure how 'by other means' really gets reconciled with strong identity. It seems to me to suggest at least a partial disanalogy.

Whereas you said "If war is politics by other means, then politics is also war by other means, which rules out politics being a solution to war "

I would say war and politics are both about pressing competing interests, but the difference is indeed in the means - violent or peaceful. What we want to avoid is not people pressing competing claims, but violence. Thus politics can be the solution to war, because it is by other means.

Rob Jubb said...

"war and politics are both about pressing competing interests, but the difference is indeed in the means - violent or peaceful. What we want to avoid is not people pressing competing claims, but violence. Thus politics can be the solution to war, because it is by other means."

I agree with this, Ben, but that's not what Clausewitz, or, if you prefer, the version of Clausewitz I set up as a strawman to illustrate Williams' views, is saying. To say 'x is nothing but the continuation of y' is a classic example of reductionist identity claim: the nothing but aims at erasing the difference between the two by dismissing them out of hand as irrelevant or insignificant. In this case, whichever one is being reduced to the other - and unless the existence of one is being denied, as in the reductionism of say eliminativist materialism in the philosophy of mind - the priority given to one or the other should be in theory reversible, since the claim is that they are the same.

Ben said...

It's clear neither of us are experts on Clausewitz, and I've forgotten the Williams point you were really trying to make [must read that piece this w/e, btw], but pressing on with the debate for it's own merits...

'The mental is nothing but brain activity' (if that's something like you meant) doesn't seem to me to imply 'brain activity is mental'. It means all that is mental is (also/actually) brain activity. It doesn't follow all brain activity is mental, the mental may be a subset of brain activity. Thus it isn't strict identity.

Rob Jubb said...

Ben,

agreed about the Clausewitz. The other stuff, though:

"In this case, whichever one is being reduced to the other - and unless the existence of one is being denied, as in the reductionism of say eliminativist materialism in the philosophy of mind - the priority given to one or the other should be in theory reversible, since the claim is that they are the same."

"'The mental is nothing but brain activity' (if that's something like you meant) doesn't seem to me to imply 'brain activity is mental'. It means all that is mental is (also/actually) brain activity. It doesn't follow all brain activity is mental, the mental may be a subset of brain activity."

There's an unless there, so the claim reads something like:

'assertions of the type 'x is nothing but y' are statements of (essential) identity and thus imply the claim 'y is x' except in cases where the assertion is coupled with the claim that y, for whatever reason, does not really exist.'

We might read nothing but claims of the type made by eliminative materialism as saying something like:

'what we call y is in fact x, and any talk of this y is misleading and unhelpful, because what we call y not only is x but should be described x'.

I'm no longer entirely sure about whether all other nothing but claims imply reversibility (although I still think the one in question should). It may well be a matter of context: which features of what x is nothing but are being picked out as the relevant features for x to be nothing but are, after all, likely to be determined by what the discussion around what x is focuses on.

Ben said...

Sorry, I think I did miss your unless the first time.

Mind you, from some of what you said above, it sounded like Clausewitz might be making a reductionist claim - as in 'there's no need to talk about war as something distinct, it's only (a form of) politics'.

That would be one way I initially interpreted it: war being a subset of politics, distinguished by violent means. If war is a subset of politics, then as I was pointing out in my previous (albeit misdirected) example the identity isn't strict.

The slight complication is I'm unclear whether 'politics' should refer to any conflict of interests, including war (violence) as a sub-set, or whether politics proper as it were means only the non-violent part of conflict, with war being the violent half (so the two exhaust conflicts of interest). [See my 9:22am comment]

I'm agnostic between those two interpretations, but neither seem strong identity ones.

Rob Jubb said...

I was reading politics as the attempt to resolve conflicts without recourse to inter-state violence. I suppose you could say something like politics is conflict over who gets authority between groups all of which are competing for the same position, whereas war is conflict between some number of apparent authorities over the extent of that authority.

Rob Jubb said...

violent conflict in the case of war, obviously

Ben said...

I don't think war is necessarily inter-state, or civil war wouldn't really be war. (That's possible - like a prima facie duty isn't a duty - but I don't think plausible in this case)

The distinction between who gets a given position of authority and the extent of an authority is a much more interesting one. I'm not sure it maps what I'd intuitively consider politics and war. Two sides could come to fighting over who had the legitimate claim to the throne, for example. Similarly sovereignty over a disputed territory could be resolved by diplomacy.

I always understood the saying as meaning the two (politics and war) are essentially the same process - attempts to win a conflict of interests - but differ in means.