For some time, I've been making rather a lot of the 'all social arrangements are coercive' line, particularly as a stick to beat libertarians with, with what's probably the clearest exposition here. Partly because of this comment, which points to what I must admit is something of a standing problem with the claim - that the generally pejorative nature of coercion doesn't seem to necessarily apply to social arrangements simply in virtue of being social arrangements - I'd like to give something of a genealogy of the idea, at least so far as I am concerned, which hopefully should illuminate what motivates it.
The idea comes from one way of running a critique of one of the dominant developments of post-Rawlsian political theory, luck egalitarianism, which holds that unequal outcomes are justified so long as they originate from choice, but that equality is required of outcomes which do not have their causal roots in choice, or, to make it clear why it is so named, that outcomes associated with brute luck must be equalized. Now, there are obviously a number of different ways of cashing out precisely what is meant by choice and brute luck, but the core of any view claiming to be luck egalitarian is the thought that when an agent is responsible for a particular outcome, interference with that outcome would be wrong, whereas when an outcome occurs through no fault of the agent, equalization is mandated. There may well be very serious problems in finding adequate accounts of responsibility, as the rather extensive literatures on both the freedom of the will and luck egalitarianism itself suggest, to provide anything like a sharp line between brute luck and choice that the luck egalitarians need, but I'm fairly sure that that is not the most serious problem with luck egalitarianism.
The fatal difficulty for luck egalitarianism is that it refuses to take its concern with responsibility anything like seriously enough, since in any society containing more than one individual, let alone incredibly complex ones containing millions of people, the idea that anyone is responsible for whatever costs happen to attach to any particular action is under exceptional high levels of strain. On any reasonable account of brute luck, it must surely be brute luck that the employment market values someone's labour at the level that it does, or even that there is something that we can sensibly call an employment market, since both depend on the actions of any number of others, over whom any one individual rarely has more than tangential control. If luck egalitarians are genuinely concerned with responsibility, they are stymied, because in saying that agents should bear the costs and gain the benefits that they are responsible for, they forget the surely incontestable fact that, whilst agents are often responsible for acts which have costs and benefits attached, they are not individually responsible for the particular costs and benefits that are attached. This stymies them, because it prevents them from taking a position on the legitimacy of any outcomes: if the actual value of an action is always a matter of brute luck, then the luck egalitarian claim that outcomes that are a result of brute luck are illegitimate and should be equalized does no work, because any outcome, including equalization, would be the result of brute luck.
To illustrate by example, think of a state which institutes luck egalitarianism, and compensates those who suffer and taxes those who gain as the result of brute luck. Presumably, anyone who disagreed with this situation would be entitled to complain to the relevant authorities that it was, for them, a matter of brute luck that they live in a state which has decided that it should adopt luck egalitarianism as a distributive principle. Say, moved by the force of this complaint, the authorities altered their policy to whatever distributive principle or principles that the complainant preferred. Yet, then, equally, wouldn't anybody who for some reason disapproved of that principle or principles be able to make the same complaint? No any one distribution can be justified by luck egalitarianism, because living under any one distributional principle is itself a matter of brute luck, something which agents are not generally responsible for, requiring redress.
This is where the 'all social arrangements are coercive' line comes in. The thought that no distribution is something which any one person can be responsible for, given the complexity of social interaction, leads, I think, relatively quickly, when coupled with the thought that others having control over the costs and benefits associated with a particular action is coercive, to the thought that all social arrangements are, simply because they are social arrangements, coercive. As I said in reply to Ben here, that doesn't imply an all-things-considered moral judgement, but it does mean that justification of them, to all of those who live under them, is required.
Sunday, November 27, 2005
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4 comments:
"[I]t must surely be brute luck that the employment market values someone's labour at the level that it does, or even that there is something that we can sensibly call an employment market, since both depend on the actions of any number of others, over whom any one individual rarely has more than tangential control."
I think Dworkin has some plausibility just appealing to market prices and NOT being a luck egalitarian here. One might criticise him for stopping arbitrarily as it were, if one thinks the logic of his equality drives towards full LE, which treats these market prices/costs as luck; but you're right, if that's accepted the luck egalitarian is hopelessly lost.
"[T]hink of a state which institutes luck egalitarianism, and compensates those who suffer and taxes those who gain as the result of brute luck. Presumably, anyone who disagreed with this situation would be entitled to complain to the relevant authorities that it was, for them, a matter of brute luck that they live in a state which has decided that it should adopt luck egalitarianism as a distributive principle."
I think most people would just rule out inter-schemic comparisons. There are two vaguely possible alternatives I think:
(i) If LE is right, it isn't a matter of luck that that's adopted. It'd be like someone failing their maths homework and complaining it's a matter of luck that 2+2=4 not 5. That that's the true may be luck (in some complex 'contingently necessary' modal fashion), but our practices respond to something and therefore aren't simply arbitrary.
(ii) To insist distributive schemes come about democratically, portraying them as collective choice, and therefore (in a Rousseauvian way at least) the choice even of the would-be complainant.
Ben,
I don't think Dworkin is a luck egalitarian for precisely this reason. Luck egalitarians lack a way of assessing whether a cost is of itself reasonable, whereas Dworkin's true opportunity costs at least knows when a cost is of itself illegitimate (there may be a point about the difference between pure and perfect procedures buried somewhere here).
I'm not sure about the inter-schemic comparison point. Neither of the putative defences can be made from within luck egalitarianism, since neither appeal to anything to do with the brute luck/option luck distinction. That isn't necessarily a problem for luck egalitarians, but they need some account of how it is that whatever it is that they appeal to fits into or with luck egalitarianism. It at least has to count as a restriction on the scope of luck egalitarianism, indicating that there are other moral truths, presumably about much the same kind of domain, which could well restrict it. For example, we might, harshly, say that it's not a matter of brute luck, but a valid distributional principle in the same way as luck egalitarianism is, that some old people get serious arthritic pain, and refuse to compensate them.
Either way, as you note, the inter-schemic point doesn't have to hold for the more general critique to run.
I've also been of the view Dworkin's not a LE for a while, helps that he rejects the term - though it seems we're not reading Scheffler now.
I'm not sure about your "Neither of the putative defences can be made from within luck egalitarianism, since neither appeal to anything to do with the brute luck/option luck distinction."
Option luck = chosen. If the LE redistributive program is *chosen* - here democratically, perhaps unanimously - no one can complain.
Well, if it's chosen unanimously, then those who chose it can't complain, but for anyone other than them, it's a matter of brute luck. So, subsequent generations and immigrants are entitled to complain even if the decision is unanimous as long as all that is being appealed to is luck egalitarianism itself. Actually care about democracy, and you have some grounds for compulsion, but you actually care about, I don't know, the rule of the people, and that operates as a limit on the scope of luck egalitarianism.
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